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Justice Blackmun and the Good
Physician: Patients, Populations, and
the Paradox of Medicine
by ANN ALPERS*
In dedicating the seminal textbook American Health Law to Jus-
tice Blackmun, the editors wrote that the Justice's "deep understand-
ing of the world of medical practice and his empathy for both
physicians and patients are a source of inspiration" to all who struggle
for justice in health care.' As a result, they noted, he successfully and
eloquently advocated for patients' rights while simultaneously sup-
porting reasonable autonomy for physicians. Ultimately, Justice
Blackmun's affinity for physicians and medical practice and his ability
to weave together the often disparate worlds of law and medicine in
his opinions are vital to his unique contributions to health law.
I begin this exploration of the Justice's medical jurisprudence by
examining the "world of medical practice" that the Justice observed so
keenly. Next, I discuss two separate themes that run through his opin-
ions: his rich and sophisticated vision of the doctor-patient relation-
ship and his thorough understanding of empirical data and
quantitative methods. Reflection on these two elements of his juris-
prudence leads me to conclude that he understood the medical prac-
tice both in its most intimate moments-patients' private encounters
with their health-care providers-and in its most public mission-to
ensure, through epidemiology and scientific innovation, the overall
health of the general population. In light of the legacy of the Justice's
opinions, I cannot resist speculating about how he would answer the
most pressing problem which besets today's physicians: in a world of
limited health care dollars, how can doctors reconcile their obligations
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to serve their individual patient's best interests with their obligations
to conserve resources so as to promote the health of large
populations?
The Dream of Scientific Domination
What world of medical practice had Justice Blackmun observed
so astutely and understood so well? Medicine changed dramatically
during Justice Blackmun's life. The first era of medicine, during which
he was born, was prescientific. It could offer little diagnosis, some
degree of comfort, and, through careful attention to the spiritual
needs of the ill, some shrewd ways of keeping hope alive in the face of
inevitable death. During this long era of human history (an era which
has yet to end in some underdeveloped areas of the world), the ideal
of the physician's exclusive devotion to the welfare of the patient took
shape. It was a paradigm nurtured in the West by the Hippocratic
tradition, and with it came the moral requirements of sensitivity and
compassion.
The second era of medicine has been dominated by faith in sci-
ence and medical progress. The pace of medical discovery and clinical
application has leapt forward from the great discoveries of Claude
Bernard (body as an integrated whole),3 Pasteur (germ theory of dis-
ease),4 Edwin Chadwick (the English sanitation movement)5 , Marie
Curie (theory of radioactivity)6 , and Margaret Sanger (safe and effec-
tive birth control)7 to the post-World War II expectation of unlimited
medical advances that promise to save and extend life.' With
medicine's amazing progress after the inauguration of the antibiotic
era, physicians moved to a disease-centered concept of the patient.
Medicine became "the physiology and pathophysiology, the immunol-
ogy and microbiology, the genetics and neuroscience, that deliver a
fact-like, quantifiable picture of order and disorder within the body."9
The new technical ability to understand and study cells and organ sys-
2. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, FALSE HOPES: WHY AMERICA'S QUEST FOR PERFECT
HEALTH IS A RECIPE FOR FAILURE 27 (1998).
3. See id at 28.
4. See id
5. See id.
6. See generally SUSAN QUIN, MARIE CURIE: A LIFE (1996).
7. See generally ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE
BIRTH CONTROL MovEMENT IN AMERICA (Anchor Books, 1993).
8. See CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 28.
9. ALBERT R. JONSEN, TiH NEw MEDICINE AND THE OLD ETHICs 25 (1990).
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tems relegated the psychological and spiritual needs of individuals to
the periphery.
What was the result of promoting a biomedical model of patient
care over a more holistic one? On a public level, this approach has
created what Victor Fuchs calls "the technological imperative," a
strong preference for aggressive medical interventions to combat dis-
ease." Indeed, from the mid 1970s to the present, medical and health
policy literature have noted the deeply interventionist bent of Ameri-
can medicine. 1 In comparison to other countries (including neighbor-
ing Canada), the United States generally records high rates of surgery,
diagnostic tests, and other procedures. From the perspective of the
individual patient, this medical activism has led to impersonal treat-
ment that can be overly burdensome and "unwittingly cruel."12 In-
deed, public fears about facing "death in a technologic cocoon"13 or
becoming "prisoners of technology"' 4 have fueled the movement to
legalize physician-assisted suicide.'"
How did Justice Blackmun, born before the antibiotic era and a
witness to the explosion of scientific medicine into a biotechnical em-
pire, see the relationship between physicians and patients? For him,
the doctor-patient relationship was the foundation of medical care.'6
Thus, he understood the importance of balancing the relationships be-
tween doctors, patients, and, ultimately, the state.' 7 One of the Jus-
tice's most important legal contributions to the Court's application of
this balance was his unwavering commitment to patients' medical and
10. VICroR R. Fuciis, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 60 (1974).
11. See COMMIrTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIn, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Ap-
PROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIn 47 (Marilyn J. Field & Chris-
tine K. Cassel eds., 1997).
12. Daniel Callahan, Frustrated Mastery: The Cultural Context of Death in America,
163 W.J. MED. 226, 228 (1995).
13. Id.
14. Marcia Angell, Prisoners of Technology: The Case of Nancy Cruzan, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1226, 1228 (1990).
15. See generally George J. Annas, The Right to Die in America: Sloganeering from
Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 Duo. L. REv. 875 (1996).
16. Leading medical ethics commentators agree with the Justice's assessment. For ex-
ample, the physician/philosopher Howard Brody has argued that the central ethical issues
in primary care medicine involve the patient-physician relationship. See HOWARD BRODY,
THE HEALER'S POWER 55-59 (1992).
17. See generally Larry Gostin, Guest Editor's Introduction, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 153
(1987); Harold Hongju Koh, Rebalancing The Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun's Contribu-
tions to Law and Medicine, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315 (1987).
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personal privacy. 18 Also vital were his respect for the non-physicians
who provide professional health care, commitment to an honest ex-
change of information, and, above all, a complete sense of the patient
as a whole person rather than as an organ system troubled by dis-
ease.19 This deep appreciation of the subtle aspects of the doctor-pa-
tient relationship placed him in the forefront of the debate over
medical ethics. This accomplishment is all the more remarkable given
that even those who supported his commitment to patients' freedom
of choice and to women's emancipation criticized as naive or mis-
placed the Justice's emphasis on physician autonomy and medical
authority.20
Respecting Patients by Respecting Confidentiality
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,21 Justice Black-
mun criticized an Ohio abortion law's onerous parental-notification
and judicial-bypass provisions. The Justice particularly objected to the
statute's requirement that physicians personally give notice to the mi-
nor patient's parents that she was pregnant and seeking an abortion.22
In his opinion, the Justice argued that the State had failed to explain
how requiring physicians to violate doctor-patient confidentiality
would advance minors' health interests.23 Even if such a disclosure
were proper, he wrote, the State had failed to explain why parents
could not be notified by counselors, nurses, or other health profes-
sionals.24 Justice Blackmun proceeded to remark that the notification
provision also harmed the interests of doctors by interfering with their
"experienced professional judgment."'25 Blackmun wrote:
If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recognized by the
State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment, and
he should be permitted to exercise that judgment as to whether
he or another professional should be the person who will notify
18. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 539 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387-88 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and
Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ.
51, 59 (1983); Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARv. L. Rnv.
717, 719-22 (1983); Gostin, supra note 17, at 154; Koh, supra note 17, at 318-20.
21. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
22. See id. at 539 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 540.
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a minor's parents of her decision to terminate her pregnancy. I
have no doubt that the attending physician, better than the Ohio
Legislature, will know when a consultation with the parent is
necessary.... The strictures of this Ohio law not only unduly
burden the minor's right to an abortion, but impinge on thephy-
sician's professional discretion in the practice of medicine.
For the Justice, the professional discretion afforded to physicians
must include the authority to determine for themselves when the vio-
lation of confidentiality is in their minor patients' best interest.
Physicians are ethically obliged to assess an adolescent's capacity
to make informed decisions and to ascertain the patient's preferences
regarding medical care.2 7 In almost all cases, physicians urge pregnant
adolescents to discuss their pregnancies with their parents and to ob-
tain parental consent.8 Thus, whenever possible, disagreements over
health care are resolved informally between adolescents, parents, and
physicians.2 9 Blackmun stressed that the well-being of an adolescent
must be the physician's first concern and that parental notification is
not in an adolescent's best interest when it places her at psychosocial
or physical risk.3 0 Justice Blackmun, with his pained awareness of
"another world 'out there'" 3 1 inhabited by "frightened and forlorn" 32
adolescents who "lack[ed] the comfort of loving parental guidance
and mature advice,"33 understood that almost no State interest sup-
ported jeopardizing the safety and well-being of a minor. In under-
standing the importance of giving physicians the discretion to assess
the needs and interests of the minor patient, the Justice demonstrated
a thorough understanding of adolescent medical practice: in order to
26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. See Isabel Traugott & Ann Alpers, In Their Own Hands: Adolescents' Refusals of
Medical Treatment, 151 ARcHIVEs OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 922, 924 (1997).
28. ANGELA R. HOLDER, LEGAL IssuEs IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
293 (2d ed. 1985).
29. Traugott & Alpers, supra note 27, at 926.
30. See ETHICAL IsSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN AND ADo-
LEsCENTS 190-91 (Kimberly Hoagwood et al. eds., 1996). Physicians have objected to other
mandatory reporting requirements, such as laws requiring the reporting of domestic vio-
lence, by noting that retaliation and violence may follow some reports and that health care
professionals need discretion to tailor breaches of patient confidentiality to the specific
cases before them. See Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Vio-
lence: Do They Promote Patient Well-being?, 273 JAMA 1781, 1784-86 (1995).
31. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977).
32. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990).
33. Id.
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respect adolescents as people, doctors must protect their confidential-
ity as patients.34
Justice Blackmun's respect for the confidentiality rights of adoles-
cents presaged the growing consensus that sound ethical practice re-
quires physicians to make case-by-case decisions about how to protect
individual patients. Today, the majority of states give physicians dis-
cretion as to whether or not to inform a third party-such as a spouse
or needle-sharing partner-that a patient has tested positive for the
human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"). 3s In contrast, only a handful
of states require a health care provider to inform those whom their
patients may expose to HIV 6
Comprehensive Care Outside Medicine's Hierarchy
Justice Blackmun, whose affection and support for physicians is
unquestioned, quickly recognized a reality physicians themselves have
been slow to appreciate: patient-centered care demands a multidis-
ciplinary team of "allied health professionals," including advanced
practice nurses, genetics counselors, nurse-midwives, and nurse-practi-
tioners. Hence, the Justice objected in Planned Parenthood of South-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey37 to the Commonwealth's requirement that
only a doctor could provide mandatory information about the nature
and the risks of the abortion procedure and the probable gestational
age of the fetus. 8 Though he noted that Pennsylvania's law increased
costs to the clinics and their patients, cost was merely one of the Jus-
34. See Society for Adolescent Medicine, Confidential Health Care for Adolescents:
Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 21 J. ADOLESCENT HEATH 408-15
(1997).
35. This discretion to physicians is now under reconsideration since New York State
recently amended its reporting requirements to require physicians to report HIV-positive
individuals to the public health department for contact tracing. See Lynda Richardson,
Wave of Laws Aimed at People with HIV, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 25, 1998, at Al. New York
plans to treat HIV as it treats other sexually transmitted diseases, like gonorrhea and
syphilis. See id. The new law has been criticized as insensitive to individual privacy and
liberty and particularly unrealistic about the stigma of HIV. See id. Justice Blackmun
raised precisely these concerns about violations of confidentiality in the context of abortion
decisions. See, e.g., Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 529-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Legislative Survey of State Confidentiality Laws With
Specific Emphasis on HIV and Immunization, at Table 3 (Final report presented to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemi-
ologists, and the Task Force for Child Survival and Development, Carter Presidential
Center, submitted July 2, 1996) (on fie with Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
37. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
38. Id. at 935 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
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tice's concerns-more important were women's personal interests.3 9
"[T]rained women counselors," the Justice observed, "are often more
understanding than physicians, and generally have more time to spend
with patients.
4 °
Several research studies support Justice Blackmun's emphasis on
the importance of training to make counseling effective. For instance,
the Center for Disease Control's Project RESPECT recently demon-
strated that interactive counseling sessions delivered by trained HIV
counselors helped reduce the rate of sexually transmitted diseases by
up to thirty percent-a result even more effective than achieved by an
unadorned HIV/STD educational message delivered by a clinician.41
Human genetics counseling also provides an apt comparison to abor-
tion counseling because genetic counselors also work in an obstetrics
setting (where pregnant women and their partners receive prenatal
testing).4z Often, genetics counselors with neither masters nor doc-
toral degrees educate patients about a single diagnostic category of
disease or assist masters-level counselors in overcoming cultural, lin-
guistic, geographic, or economic barriers.43 By respecting the contri-
butions of diverse clinicians Justice Blackmun understood that often
care-givers from a variety of backgrounds could speak more directly
to each patient's individual needs and provide more sensitive care to
vulnerable individuals than could doctors.
Critical care and hospice literature have also recognized the im-
portance of multi-disciplinary care in resolving disputes between phy-
sicians and families. These sources note that social workers, nurses,
clergy members, and psychologists often negotiate more successfully
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Mary L. Kamb et al., Efficacy of Risk-Reduction Counseling to Prevent Human
Immunodeficiency Virus and Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 280 JAMA 1161, 1165 (1998);
see also M.L. Kamb et al., Quality Assurance of HIV Prevention Counseling in a Multi-
Center Randomized Controlled Trial, 111 PUtBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 99, supp. 1 (1996)
(describing the procedural aspects of the study).
42. See INsTrrurE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING GENETIC RiSKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH AND SoCIAL POLICY 59-86 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter As-
SESSING GENETIc RsS] (describing prenatal diagnosis for "hundreds of conditions" and
noting that offering prenatal diagnosis is the standard of care for women aged 35 and
older); see also Professional Liability Implications of AFP Testing, DPL ALERT, (American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists), May 1985.
43. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 42, at 212-13 (1994) (describing genetic
aides programs for individuals who serve as single-gene counselors, hemoglobin trait coun-
selors, sickle-cell educators, genetic counseling aides, genetic educators, and genetic
interpreters).
HASTINGS CONSTTUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
with families than can physicians.' The presence of therapists, social
workers, nurses, and others has also helped the hospice movement
make the spiritual and psychological aspects of dying more familiar to
Americans and more available to dying people.45
A Vision of Informed Consent: Honesty and Beneficence
No aspect of today's health care environment has raised as much
public concern as managed care organizations' restrictions on a physi-
cian's power to inform a patient about vital medical decisions. In-
deed, this concern has spurred a federally proposed patients' "bill of
rights ' 46 and similar state attempts to shift the power of medical deci-
sion-making back to the doctor and patient. These laws would codify
a patient's right to receive information about diagnosis and treatment
and to make medical decisions with a physician.47
Justice Blackmun's support for the beneficence of physicians 48
and his insistence on unhindered professional judgment have long
promoted the importance of doctor-patient shared, private decision-
making-the central tenets of informed consent.49 Perhaps even
more vital, however, was the value the Justice placed on simple hon-
esty. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in his dissent from Rust v.
Sullivan," wherein the majority permitted the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to forbid health care providers in a federally
funded clinic from informing or counseling pregnant women about
abortion:
The majority ... [contends] that "the Title X program regula-
tions do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient rela-
tionship." That the doctor-patient relationship is substantially
burdened by a rule prohibiting the dissemination by the physi-
cian of pertinent medical information is beyond serious dis-
44. See Thomas J. Prendergast, Resolving Conflicts Surrounding End-of-Life Care, in 5
NEw HORIZONs 62, 70 (1997).
45. See MARILYN WEBB, Tim GOOD DEATH: THE NEW AMERICAN SEARCH TO
REsHAPE THE END OF LIE 224 (1997) (comparing hospice to home-birth as a non-medical
treatment that "feed[s] back" into medicine).
46. Robert Pear, White House Says Veto of 'Patient Protection' Bill Is Likely, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1998, at A18.
47. See, e.g., Chronicle Sacramento Bureau, New Protections for Patients: Wilson OKs
Bills on Mastectomies, Surgical Repair, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 1998, at A21.
48. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) ("The good physician - despite the
presence of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that most physicians
are 'good' - will have sympathy and understanding for the... patient .... ).
49. See BERNARD Lo, REsOLVING ETHnCAL DLEmMAs: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANs 24-
35 (1995).
50. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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pute.... A woman seeking the services of a Title X clinic has
every reason to expect, as do we all, that her physician will not
withhold relevant information regarding the very purpose of her
visit. To suggest otherwise is to engage in uninformed fantasy."'
To the Justice, any intrusion "upon the physician's exercise of
proper professional judgment... [with] compelled information is the
antithesis of informed consent." 2 Thus, requiring a doctor to obtain a
hospital committee's approval before conducting an abortion 3 or to
give a woman information about fetal development54 interfered with
the ability of a patient to make private and informed decisions about
her health. 5 The Justice noted that state-mandated information may
serve only to confuse and punish the patient and to heighten her anxi-
ety, contrary to accepted medical practice. "[It] may be out of step
with the needs of the particular woman and thus places the physician
in an awkward position and infringes upon his or her professional re-
sponsibilities . . . [and] the dialogue between the woman and her
physician."56
Justice Blackmun's insistence on a physician's autonomous ability
to tailor informed consent conversations to each patient is particularly
relevant in light of what some commentators view as the excesses of
managed care organizations. Some managed care contracts restrict
doctors from giving patients information about potentially relevant
medical interventions not covered under the plan, information about
non-plan-approved specialists who might help manage the patient's
condition' or information about the economic incentives the plan of-
fers to physicians who perform or order fewer interventions.57 I sus-
pect that at best Justice Blackmun would be quite suspicious of such
contracts, and might very well be appalled. His sentiments in Bolton,
Thornburgh and Rust seem to have presaged today's tensions about
physician autonomy and a patient's need for information. Justice
Blackmun recognized that informed consent requires time, patience,
understanding, and trust.
51. Id. at 212 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
52. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
764 (1986) (striking down a Pennsylvania law that required physicians to provide certain
information about the abortion procedure to their patients, report certain information to
the state, try to preserve the life of the fetus, and have a second physician present during
an abortion performed when the fetus might be viable).
53. See Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197-98.
54. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762-73.
55. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
56. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762.
57. See Ruth Faden, Managed Care and Informed Consent, 7 KNNEDY INST. ETmICs
1. 377, 377-78 (1997).
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To the Justice, informed consent was more than an abstract ethi-
cal ideal to uphold or a bald legal duty to discharge. Rather, it was a
chance to build patient-doctor trust and foster an environment condu-
cive to intensely personal decisions: ultimately, informed consent was
vital to safeguarding patients' constitutionally protected liberty
interests.5
The Patient as Whole Person
From Roe v. Wade5 9 until Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians,60 Justice Blackmun's Supreme Court abortion opinions
stressed the value of the professional autonomy of physicians. By
leaving the state "free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as
the period of pregnancy lengthens," Roe sought to "vindicat[e] the
right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his
professional judgment up to the points where important state interests
provide compelling justifications for intervention."'" Some have thus
criticized Roe's interest-balancing analysis for protecting the individ-
ual right of the doctor and not the patient.62 The Justice responded in
Thornburgh by making clear that the Constitution protected the preg-
nant woman's private sphere of liberty. "Few decisions, " he wrote,
"are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more ba-
sic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision...
whether to end her pregnancy."63 Blackmun's subsequent opinions,
58. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990) (holding that an individual who
was not competent to give informed consent, and was consequently involuntarily commit-
ted to a mental institution for five months, has a justiciable claim).
59. 410 U.S. 171 (1973) (holding that a woman's right, in consultation with her physi-
cian, to choose an abortion is absolute in the first trimester of pregnancy, qualified by the
state's interest in protecting the fetus in the second trimester, and subject to state prohibi-
tion in the third).
60. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
61. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. See also id. at 166 ("Up to those points, the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic respon-
sibility for it must rest with the physician.").
62. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HAR1v. L. REv. 330, 335
(1985) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade spoke as though it were protecting the
'privacy' rights of both the woman and her physician, and indeed at times as though the
physician's rights were somehow primary .... "); Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of
the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Dis-
cretion, 6 HARv. WormBN's LJ. 51,59 (1983) ("Blackmun's abortion opinions are as much
vindications of the right of the physician to practice medicine as they are feminist 'pro-
choice' victories-if not more so.").
63. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
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including his dissent in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,6 4 have
also stressed that it is the right of the patient, regardless of age65 or
marital status,66 to make intimate personal decisions without state co-
ercion. The "quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing," 67
decision to have an abortion, the Justice wrote, is within that "'certain
private sphere of individual liberty' that the Constitution reserves
from the intrusive reach of government.
68
Though Justice Blackmun's later abortion decisions abandoned
the emphasis on the physician's professional discretion and focused
instead on the woman's privacy and autonomy, the rationale of his
initial 1970s and 1980s approach warrants some comment. In Colautti
v. Franklin,69 Blackmun examined the constitutional significance of
the physician's professional autonomy and stressed the "importance
of affording the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his
medical judgment."70 He noted that whether the procedure was medi-
cally appropriate would depend on a doctor's clinical judgment in
light of all factors relevant to the well-being of the pregnant woman:
physical, emotional, and psychological states, her family situation, and
her age.71
Colautti's assertion that a patient's emotional and psychological
health and her relationship with her family were factors in determin-
ing her medical well-being was remarkable, particularly as the deci-
sion was written in 1979. The 1970s, after all, marked the peak of the
biomedical, cell and organ-centered model of patient care.71 With in-
creasingly accurate methods for diagnosing and curing disease, the
physician's quest to control illness often failed to take the patient into
account. Beneficial as these technologies can be, illness runs a capri-
cious course. As the NIH and medical education continued to empha-
size the science of medicine and the use of technological interventions
to cure illness, physicians lost sight of the results of curing infectious
64. 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 524-26 (1990) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
66. Writing for the Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976), Blackmun struck down various Missouri statutory provisions restricting an individ-
ual woman's access to abortion, specifically those requiring spousal consent or parental
consent for a minor. See id. at 67-75.
67. Webster, 492 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 548.
69. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
70. Id. at 387.
71. See id. at 387-88 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (Blackmun, J.).
72. See CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 27-29.
51
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diseases. Thus, we are burdened by chronic diseases and disabilities
and smart, scientific medicine has not developed a plan for caring for
the chronically sick and elderly. Not only has our science failed to
improve the health of the public, but it has also concentrated medical
attention on patients' diseases and obscured the meaning of illness in
their individual lives. In his opinion in Colautti, Justice Blackmun saw
beyond this limited biomedical understanding of illness.
Only recently have medical schools and residency training pro-
grams in the United States begun to move away from the biomedical
model, and to migrate, through an emphasis on primary care, to a
more complete view of the patient. Spurred by reports that our coun-
try is producing too many specialists and too few primary care physi-
cians and by increased attention to cost containment and cost
effectiveness, medical schools and residency programs have begun
training more physicians to practice primary care. Primary care prac-
titioners "stress preventive medicine and concern for mental and emo-
tional problems as well as physical ones."' "Teachers of primary
care.., assert that their practice requires a biopsychosocial model...
rather than the more traditional biomedical [one] .... I In other
words, they instruct physicians to assess well-being from the multi-
factored perspective that Justice Blackmun set out in the mid-1970s.
Research from the University of Western Ontario has demon-
strated that the kind of patient-centered care Justice Blackmun envi-
sioned actually produces better health outcomes.75 For instance, one
study found that the accuracy of a physician's diagnosis and the so-
phistication of the ensuing treatment did not reliably predict whether
the patient felt better.76 Rather, a better predictor was the "patient's
own perception that the physician had listened carefully to the expla-
nation of the problem and had agreed with [him or her] about the
nature of the problem ....
73. HowARD BRODY, TBE HEALER'S POWER 57 (1992).
74. Id.
75. See id at 58.
76. See id. at 59.
77. Id. at 58-59 (summarizing the theoretical, therapeutic, and pedagogical approaches
to research on primary care at the University of Western Ontario and citing J.H. Leven-
stein et al., The Patient-Centered Clinical Method. Part 1. A Model for the Doctor-Patient
Interaction in Family Medicine, 3 FAMILY PRAcCE 24 (1986)).
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Formation of Justice Blackmun's Views about Patient-
Centered Care
I have suggested above that the Justice's respect for the confiden-
tiality of patient's medical information, his generous assessment of the
roles of allied health professionals, his nuanced approach to informed
consent, and his holistic view of patients all demonstrate an unusually
progressive and sensitive understanding of the doctor-patient relation-
ship. Though it is impossible to be certain about how he came to lead
American medical philosophy, I cannot resist the urge to speculate.
The Justice himself might have attributed his understanding of medi-
cal practice to the happy decade he spent as general counsel to the
Mayo Clinics and Association.78 It is also possible that the Justice's
appreciation for the patient as a whole person reflects his appreciation
for the plight of vulnerable individuals outside the social safety net.79
Finally, the fact that many of the cases he faced concerned the care of
pregnant women probably gave him insight into both the multidiscipli-
nary nature of clinical practice and the need to treat the patient as a
complete person; indeed, because pregnancy is generally not a danger-
ous condition, the harms of an unwanted pregnancy might be consid-
ered social rather than medical. By insisting that damage to
emotional and psychological well-being was nonetheless a medical
problem, the Justice came to see medicine as a therapeutic relation-
ship between individuals rather than as a pure scientific endeavor.
It might also help to understand that Justice Blackmun was fasci-
nated by Hippocrates, whom he described as the "great Greek, ...
the Father of Medicine, the 'wisest and the greatest practitioner of his
art,' and the 'most important and most complete medical personality
of antiquity,' who dominated the medical schools of his time, and who
typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past."8 It is, of
course, not uncommon to trace medical ethics to Hippocrates, as his
disciples left a large body of both scientific literature and a small col-
lection of moral maxims. Though the former is now forgotten, the
78. Justice Blackmun was the first resident counsel to the Mayos from 1950 to 1959,
years that he calls "the happiest... of my professional experience," Blackmun Remarks,
15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 175-88 (1987), a "decade of close and intimate association...
with people of medicine, with the medical mind and medical ways, and with medical educa- -
tion and research ...." Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at the Commencement Exercises of
Mayo Medical School, 55 MAYO CLINIc PROC. 573, 573 (1980).
79. See Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice
Blackmun and the Outsiders, 97 Dic. L. REv. 527 (1993).
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-31 (1973) (citing A. CASTiGLIom, A HISTORY OF
MEDICInE 84 (E. Krumbhaar trans. and ed., 2d ed. 1947)).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
latter live on as the collective conscience of medicine. For example,
Charles Fried's conditions for an ethically sound doctor-patient rela-
tionship included the Hippocratic elements of fidelity-an obligation
to act as a trustworthy fiduciary-and humanity-the obligation to
treat patients with sensitivity and compassion."' I think Justice Black-
mun would have shared Hippocrates' and Fried's sense that the physi-
cian must remember the patient's vulnerability and discern when fear,
depression, or other consequences of illness might rob the individual
of his or her usual sense of self. The Justice who saw "another world
'out there" 2 recognized that a medical clinic, like "an unfamiliar and
mystifying court system" could be a harsh forum in which to address
"intensely intimate matter[s]." s Justice Blackmun's views regarding
the doctor-patient relationship, respect for other health care provid-
ers, and holistic patient care to this day help both to protect vulnera-
ble patients and to promote fidelity and humanity.' This approach
does not confuse the patient's disease with the patient. To use a meta-
phor which geography-buff Blackmun might have appreciated, it does
not mistake the map for the territory.
Empirical Jurisprudence and Evidence-Based Medicine
Justice Blackmun's advocacy of patient-centered care only par-
tially reflects his understanding of current issues in medical practice.
We should also note that Justice Blackmun's familiarity with medical
science, coupled with his mathematics training and extended exposure
to the "exacting quantitative nature" of tax law, 5 made him unusually
"well-versed in the scientific method."8 6 Drawing upon this back-
81. See Brody, supra note 73, at 44-45.
82. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 527 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
84. I note, as well, that fidelity and humanity not only appear as essential virtues for
Justice Blackmun's conception of the good physician, but they serve as lodestars for his
own compassionate jurisprudence. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 79.
85. Justice Blackmun practiced at the Dorsey firm, the preeminent Minneapolis law
partnership, where he specialized in the characteristically precise fields of taxation, civil
litigation, and trusts and estates. See Michael Pollett, Harry A. Blackmun, in 5 THE Jus.
TICES OF THE UNrTED STATES SurR rmE COURT 3, 5 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds., 1978).
86. See Steven R. Schlesinger & Janet Nesse, Justice Harry Blackmun and Empirical
Jurisprudence, 29 Am. U.L. Rv. 405,406 & n.3 (1980); Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 341-45 (1987)
(discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983)). I am indebted to Dr. Appelbaum, whose analysis of Justice Blackmun's dissents in
Barefoot and McCleskey I have adopted here. See Appelbaum, supra note 86, at 340-41,
344-45.
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ground, the Justice used empirical data and statistical analysis to add
precision to the Court's reasoning and to "assist the court in reaching
fair adjudicative results.""7
In Barefoot v. Estelle,8 8 the Court upheld the death penalty sen-
tence based partially on two psychiatrists' predictions that the defend-
ant was likely to commit violent crime again. In reaching this
decision, the majority ignored the conclusions of an American Psychi-
atric Association amicus brief emphasizing the unreliability of long-
term psychiatric predictions of dangerousness.8 9 Indeed, most studies
of psychiatrists' predictions of patients' future violent behavior have
found that only one out of five or six such opinions turned out to be
accurate. 90 The best results-obtained in an idiosyncratic study with a
population of sex offenders-found accurate only one out of three
predictions. 91
Justice Blackmun's dissent cited much of this empirical literature
in noting that "the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field
[is] that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong
more often than they are right . . . ."9 It is therefore "difficult to
understand how the admission of such predictions can be justified as
advancing the search for truth .... ,9 He also noted correctly that
correlative conclusions are of limited utility in predicting the outcome
of an individual.94 With these factors in mind, the Justice concluded
that "[tihere is every reason to believe that inexperienced jurors will
be still less capable of 'separating the wheat from the chaff', despite
the Court's blithe assumption to the contrary." 95
Justice Blackmun demonstrated a similar appreciation of statisti-
cal evidence in McCleskey v. Kemp.96 In McCleskey, the plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of Georgia's capital sentencing pro-
cess in light of two statistical studies97 which demonstrated that race
87. Schlesinger & Nesse, supra note 86, at 406.
88. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
89. See id. at 898-99.
90. See Appelbaum, supra note 86, at 338 (citing J. MONAHAN, THE CLIMCAL. PREDIC-
TION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981)).
91. See id.
92. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 928.
94. See &L at 922.
95. Id. at 929-30.
96. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
97. McCleskey relied on two studies performed by Professor David C. Baldus and
colleagues, including a massive effort that examined sentencing practices in a sample
drawn from over 2,400 Georgia murder cases from 1973 to 1980. See Appelbaum, supra
note 86, at 341.
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substantially affected the imposition of the death penalty. Specifi-
cally, the studies showed that defendants charged with killing Whites
were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than those
charged with killing African-Americans.9 8 The Court, however, dis-
missed this data, holding that it did not demonstrate a constitutionally
significant risk of racial bias.99 The Court held that the risk could be
minimized by various procedural mechanisms, including prescribed
aggravating and mitigating factors and mandatory review by the Geor-
gia Supreme Court.'"
In his McCleskey dissent, Blackmun rejected the notion that the
Court could simultaneously accept the validity of the statistical data
and discredit its conclusions. "McCleskey," the Justice wrote, "has
demonstrated a clear pattern of differential treatment according to
race that is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race."""' The Jus-
tice also noted the Court's failure to distinguish the use of these statis-
tics in McCleskey from prior cases in which the Court had accepted
statistical analyses as proof of discriminatory intent.0 2 "The number
of variables to be taken into account does not appear to differ, and
even if the number of decision-making bodies varies, it does not do so
in any way that affects the statistical analysis."' 3
Justice Blackmun and the Paradox of Medicine
How did Justice Blackmun's vision of the doctor-patient relation-
ship and his sophisticated understanding of statistics combine to in-
form health policy? Statistical information tells us that, as a society,
we have not achieved the overall good health that should be our
goal.1°4 Evidence-based medicine suggests that some interventions
will be only marginally beneficial to many patients. 0 5 Yet we must
also remember that each patient is an individual; as Justice Blackmun
understood, a patient with a 10 percent chance of survival ultimately
98. See id. at 342.
99. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
100. See id. at 302-03, 313.
101. Id. at 361 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
102. See id at 293-94 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), Iurner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) as examples).
103. See Appelbaum, supra note 86, at 345.
104. See CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 59-72 (assessing the lack of overall health in terms
of mortality statistics, infectious disease, chronic disease, aging, genetics, and molecular
medicine).
105. Consider the painful and contentious debate over the utility of routine screening
for breast cancer in women under 50.
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can fall either in the 90 percent or the 10 percent category.10 6 Every
patient is, as Albert Jonsen describes, a "statistic of one.""1 7 This phe-
nomenon creates an inevitable tension between the need to practice
prudent medicine and the urge not to skimp on ensuring the best pos-
sible outcome for an individual patient.
Two leading medical economists described this tension as "the
paradox of excess and deprivation." ' Medical culture, ethics, and
malpractice law demand that physicians provide patients with any
medically beneficial test or treatment that the patient wants and can
afford. At the same time, the number of uninsured Americans now
reaches 41 million;1 9 what we like to call "the best health care system
in the world" continues to deny care to more people than any other
industrialized nation on earth. 10
Though Justice Blackmun appreciated the importance of each in-
dividual patient, he would also recognize that society cannot continue
to pour money into what Richard Lamm, the former governor of Col-
orado, calls "marginal medicine.""' In a world of limited resources,
society cannot simultaneously maximize the health of the individual
and the health of the group." 2 When physicians define good health
care as all possibly beneficial and reimbursable treatments going to
each individual, marginally beneficial medicine flourishes. As Victor
Fuchs observed, "'the divergence between what is beneficial for the
individual and what is beneficial to... society as a whole is the key
element in the ... health care debate.""' 3 Justice Blackmun would
understand the physician's individual commitment to delivering health
care to patients and medicine's general obligation to promote the
health of populations. Yet the Justice would not forget those who live
106. In fact, the Justice made this point in Barefoot when he noted the limited utility of
some statistical variables in an individual case. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 929-
30 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. JONsEN, supra note 9, at 115.
108. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, Universal Health Insurance Through Incen-
tives Reform, 265 JAMA 2532, 2532-36 (1991).
109. See John C. Goodman, D'Amato Care, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1997, at A18.
110. See Richard D. Lamm, Marginal Medicine, 280 JAMA 931, 933 (1998).
111. Id
112. Professor Haavi Morreim calls this dilemma "contributive justice." E. Haavi Mor-
reim, Moral Justice and Legal Justice in Managed Care: The Ascent of Contributive Justice,
23 J.L. MED. & ETmcs 247, 247 (1995). If one physician makes irrational or marginal use
of a common pool of money, that prevents another physician from meeting a higher need.
See id.
113. Lamm, supra note 110, at 993 (quoting Victor Fuchs, Poverty and Health (Feb. 27,
1992) (paper presented at Cornell University Medical College Health Policy Conference,
Ithaca, New York)).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
outside the protection of society and its health care system: wo-
114 11 ofcomen, people of color,"5 the poor,116 children," 7 and the elderly."'
In evaluating health policy, as in evaluating scientific evidence, he
would ultimately not seek an "exhaustive search for cosmic under-
standing" but a "particularized resolution."'" 9
In his parting words to his colleagues on the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Blackmun expressed hope that "when history eventually places us
in such perspective as we deserve, it at least will be able to say: 'They
did their best and did acceptably well."' 2 0 I think he would say that
the best we can provide for everyone will suffice as acceptable for
each individual. In his same remarks upon leaving the Court, he
noted the importance of acknowledging when a task is "common,
not.., individual."'' Medicine is about more than disease and health
care-it is about health and well-being in the face of human frailty.
To see only disease would contradict the Justice's emphasis on the
whole patient, the complete person. Every individual cannot have all
the health care he wants, or even all the health care he needs. How-
ever, medicine can direct its attention to the demands of an aging soci-
ety and one in which 20% of children live in poverty. 22 I think Justice
Blackmun would have said, "We can do better. We might even do
acceptably well."
114. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
116. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 212
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452, 486 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
120. Retirement of Justice Blackmun, 512 U.S. viii, ix (1994) (response letter of Black-
mun, J.).
121. Id.
122. Combined News Services, Poverty Rates Drop as Incomes Rise, NEWSDAY, Sept.
25, 1998, at A20.
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